Malware imposes tremendous threats to computer users nowadays. Since signature-based malware detection methods are neither effective nor efficient to identify new malware, many machine learning-based methods have been proposed. A common disadvantage of existing machine learning methods is that they are not based on understanding the full semantic meaning of assembly code of an executable. They rather use short assembly code fragments, because assembly code is usually too long to be modelled in its entirety. Another disadvantage is that those methods have either inferior performance or bad interpretability. To overcome these challenges, we propose an Interpretable MAware Detector (I-MAD), which achieves state-of-the-art performance on static malware detection with excellent interpretability. It integrates a hierarchical Transformer network that can understand assembly code at the basic block, function, and executable level. It also integrates our novel interpretable feed-forward neural network to provide interpretations for its detection results by pointing out the impact of each feature with respect to the prediction. Experiment results show that our model significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art static malware detection models and presents meaningful interpretations.
INTRODUCTION
M ALWARE is software written to steal credentials of computer users, damage computer systems, and encrypt documents for ransom, among other nefarious goals. Since the Internet has become an integral part of people's life, the large volume of malware spreading on it imposes tremendous threats to billions of netizens. Recognizing malware samples downloaded by legitimate users in a timely manner is thus of crucial importance for their protection. Signature-based malware detection methods are widely used in antivirus products [1] . With the signatures extracted by malware analysts, known malware samples or some of their variants can be precisely recognized. However, with obfuscation techniques or even a change of compiler, it is easy to create variants of known malware that perform the same attack, but with literally different executable code. As a result, the previously crafted signatures can no longer recognize them [2] . Furthermore, signature-based detection is also ineffective to detect new and unseen malware in most cases. There is thus a pressing need to create an intelligent malware detection system that can capture new malware or variants of known malware.
For this purpose, many machine learning-based malware analysis methods have been proposed [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . They have several advantages over signaturebased methods. First, they can automatically learn common patterns of malware from the feature space that have better generalization ability than manually crafted signatures. Second, machine learning models do not classify samples based on the existence of individual signatures, but on a comprehensive analysis of the combination of patterns they identify from the feature space [8] . Third, machine learning models do not require human experts to examine individual malware samples. They thus extensively save human labor.
Nonetheless, there are two major limitations in most machine learning-based malware detection models. One is their lack of interpretability. Linear models, such as logistic regression and Naive Bayes, are very simple and have excellent interpretability, but have inferior classification performance. The machine learning models that achieve stateof-the-art classification performance are therefore not linear models [9] , [10] . The other limitation is that existing machine learning-based methods for malware detection are not based on understanding the semantic meaning of the assembly code of an executable. It is quite challenging to fully model the assembly code of an executable because it is very long. An executable of 1 MB usually has hundreds of thousands of instructions. No effective training approaches have been proposed to train such long sequences. One common practice for using assembly code as features is to split the assembly code of an executable into short fragments, i.e., n-grams, of which the term frequency (TF) or (term frequency-inverse document frequency) TF-IDF are used as features [3] , [4] , [11] , [12] , [13] . However, with this approach, the overall semantic meaning of the executable is inevitably lost. Another practice is to match assembly functions of unknown executables to functions of known malware. The matching is not based on the semantic meaning of the function code, but on the literal similarity [14] , [15] , [16] . As a result, it still tends to miss the variants of malware that are obfuscated and cannot capture new malware. Developing a model that can understand the full semantic meaning of assembly code and simulate the procedure of how a human analyzes an executable is the key to improve the generability of an intelligent malware detection model.
Deep learning models have achieved great success in arXiv:1909.06865v2 [cs.
LG] 26 Sep 2019 understanding natural language when properly trained on large datasets [17] , [7] , [18] . In the field of natural language processing (NLP), the sizes of the corpora are usually very large, thanks to the popularity of the Internet [7] . However, most of them are unlabeled text, which makes it challenging to train deep learning models on them and transfer the knowledge to specific NLP tasks. Thus, researchers propose several pre-training methods to train deep learning models on unlabeled corpora and then fine-tune the parameters of the models for specific NLP tasks [19] , [20] , [17] , [7] , [18] , [21] , [22] , [23] . Experiment results show that those pre-training methods greatly improve the performance of deep learning models on the downstream tasks. However, it should be noted that the successful applications are mainly on short text, i.e., sentence-level tasks, such as paraphrase detection, sentiment analysis [17] , [7] , or at short-document level, such as reading comprehension and automatic summarization of news articles [22] . No evidence shows the application of deep learning on long text-related tasks, such as the summarization of multiple documents, novellas, or novels, can achieve satisfactory results.
Although deep learning models are good at understanding semantics, it is challenging to apply them to understanding the semantic meaning of the assembly code of an executable as successfully as for natural language. Assembly code can be obtained by disassembling a target executable to show its logic. It is comprised of assembly instructions such as MOV EAX, [EBP+4], and PUSH ECX. The role of instructions in assembly language is analogous to the role of words in natural language. The difficulty in training a deep learning model to understand the semantic meaning of the assembly code of an executable partially comes from the fact that it is usually very long. This is analogous to applying deep learning on long natural language text. In addition, assembly language and natural language have different characteristics in their basic units. Each instruction contains one opcode and zero or up to two operands which is quite different from a word. Usually, multiple instructions are used to fulfill one purpose (e.g., memory copy, completing if statement). Therefore, the function of an instruction heavily depends on its context. Although the meaning of a word can be contextual, it also has relatively constant meanings.
Despite the fact that assembly code of an executable is usually very long, it has an innate hierarchical structure: instructions forming basic blocks, basic blocks forming assembly functions, and assembly functions forming the ensemble of assembly code (i.e., the full logic) of an executable. The lengths of basic blocks, assembly functions, and the ensemble of the assembly code of an executable in terms of its direct sub-unit are not that long. Based on this characteristic, we propose a hierarchical Transformer (H-Tran) network. It contains three customized Transformer networks in a hierarchy to understand the semantic meaning of the assembly code of an executable at different levels: basic block, assembly function, and executable level. Its core, Transformer, was proposed by Vaswani et al. [24] for machine translation in 2017. It has received a lot of attention due to its ability to model the semantic meanings of items in a sequence based on their context. Many breakthrough papers in the deep learning field choose Transformer as their core to be pre-trained with their proposed methods and Table 1 Sample result of our malware detection and its interpretation which include the 5 factors that contribute most to the prediction and the most related assembly functions. then fine-tuned for downstream tasks. They achieved significantly new state-of-the-art performance on their downstream tasks [17] , [18] , [7] , [23] . We propose two approaches to pre-train the customized Transformers at the bottom level and middle level respectively to understand the semantic meanings of basic blocks and assembly functions. The vector representation of the assembly code of an executable is generated by the toplevel Transformer of H-Tran. In addition, features extracted from other parts of the executables are of crucial importance when the assembly code of the payload is encrypted. Therefore, multiple features are used as the inputs to our proposed interpretable feed-forward neural network (IFFNN) to perform malware detection. As its name shows, our proposed IFFNN can provide interpretation for its prediction results. An example of the prediction and its interpretation is given in Table 1 . It shows the detection results of a target file, the confidence of the result, the main factors, i.e., features, that lead to the prediction and the most related assembly functions.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
1) This paper is among the first to propose a deep learning model to understand the full semantic meaning of the assembly code of an executable for malware detection. 2) We propose two pre-training tasks to train the bottom-level and middle-level components of our H-Tran respectively to understand the semantic meaning of assembly code at basic block and function level. 3) We improve the way to use printable string features and PE import features from previous works with our insights towards malware. 4) We propose an interpretable feed-forward neural network as the classification module of our I-MAD model. It allows I-MAD to interpret why it classifies an executable to be malicious or benign by pointing out which features are the main factors leading to the results. Our attribution mechanism shows that the vector representation of assembly code learned by the H-Tran and our improved way to represent the features are highly effective for malware de-tection. Furthermore, the interpretable feed-forward neural network can be applied to general classification tasks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 formulates the formal problem definition. Section 4 provides the details of our proposed method. Section 5 presents the experiment results and analyses. Section 6 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK

Malware Detection
Malware detection fall into two categories: static and dynamic methods. Static methods examine the static content of an executable, while dynamic methods run an executable and analyze its behavior. The most common features used in static methods include binary sequences [25] , [26] , [12] , [6] , assembly code sequences [3] , [4] , [11] , [12] , [13] , numerical PE header features [12] , [5] , [6] , PE imports [25] , [5] , [6] , and printable strings [25] , [27] , [6] . The way most researchers use binary sequences or assembly code sequences is to cut them into n-gram pieces to form features [25] , [26] , [3] , [4] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [6] . Consequently, the full logic of the original executable is scattered into fragments, making the comprehension of the whole semantic meaning of the executable nearly impossible. Thus, this approach inevitably introduces confusion in malware detection. There are also instance-based detection methods which identify malware by checking whether an executable contains assembly functions of known malware [14] , [12] , [16] .
Dynamic methods run a target executable in an isolated environment, e.g., a virtual machine or an emulator, and extract features, such as the memory image of the executable [28] , [29] , [30] , the executed instructions [31] , [4] , [11] , [12] , and the invoked system calls or behaviors derived from them [32] , [33] , [12] , [29] , [27] , [13] , [30] .
Both static and dynamic methods have their advantages and disadvantages. Compared with static methods, dynamic methods provide more abundant and direct information. Even though both static and dynamic methods extract system calls as features, the analyst can always see the parameters passed to those invoked system calls with dynamic methods, which is not the case for static methods [32] , [29] , [27] , [13] . Moreover, when a malware file is packed, or is polymorphic or metamorphic, the payload probably cannot be seen with static methods. Yet, to perform its malicious action, it has to reveal the payload during execution [32] . This gives another advantage of dynamic over static methods. However, it does not mean that static methods cannot capture malware with those mechanisms, because their use is suspicious and can be detected. Previous works on static malware detection show that when analyzing an unknown executable from multiple feature scopes, it is hard for the malware to evade the detection [12] , [27] . On the other hand, one serious shortcoming of dynamic methods is that when a malware sample finds that its running is monitored, it will not perform its malicious action to evade the detection. Therefore, dynamic methods will fail to recognize that it is malware [32] , [2] . In addition, dynamically analyzing an executable is quite time-consuming. To avoid these disadvantages of dynamic methods, we propose a static malware detection approach in this paper.
Transformer
As programming language and natural language share some similar characteristics, the experience in modeling the latter can be customized to model the former. Before Vaswani et al. [24] proposed the deep learning model known as Transformer, most state-of-the-art neural machine translation models belonged to the class of attention-based recurrent neural network (RNN) models. In these models, an RNN is used to encode the source text and another RNN with attention mechanism is used to generate the translation word by word [34] , [35] . The attention mechanism is used to determine the importance of the words in the source text for generating each translated word. One disadvantage of this type of model is that the recurrence nature precludes parallelism. Another disadvantage is that the attention mechanism assigns only one importance weight to a word in the source text, so it can just focus on one aspect of the words in the source text. Transformer addresses both problems and achieves new state-of-the-art performance on machine translation by abandoning the RNN and relying only on an improved attention mechanism [24] . The attention mechanism in Transformer is referred to as multi-head attention, which allows multiple attention weights to be assigned to each item. Each weight corresponds to one aspect of an item, thus their attention mechanism is more powerful than the previously proposed attention mechanism in its modeling ability [24] . As there is no RNN in it, the recurrence nature of the encoder does not exist anymore, which tremendously increases the computation efficiency. Since 2017, researchers see the potential of Transformer and propose their own ways to pre-train Transformer on unlabeled corpora that are abundant and then fine-tune it for downstream NLP tasks. They constantly achieve significantly better results than previous methods on many NLP tasks [17] , [7] , [18] , [23] . To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to customize multiple Transformers in a hierarchy to understand assembly code for malware detection.
Interpretable Networks
In most cases, deep learning models are proposed to achieve the best performance on a certain research problem without considering its interpretability. However, interpretability is very important for the applications in some fields. In healthcare, the rationale of the decisions or predictions made by deep learning models and the contributions of different factors leading to them need to be validated by a doctor as it concerns patients' health [36] , [37] , [10] . In cybersecurity, it is also instructive for system administrators or malware analysts to know the reasons for which the intelligent malware detection systems make the judgments [10] . Shicke et al. [37] criticize that deep learning models are hard to interpret. Therefore, linear models dominate applied clinical informatics. They also reviewed some attempts to make deep learning models interpretable. Choi et al. [9] propose the interpretable network RETAIN for predictions in healthcare. They use two attention-based RNN networks to compute the importance of each feature to a certain output result, so it can be seen as a softmax regression with dynamically computed weights and thus has excellent interpretability. Inspired by their method, we propose to use a feed-forward neural network to simulate a logistic regression with dynamically computed weight of each feature to achieve the same interpretability as logistic regression while keeping the performance of non-linear models.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we define some important concepts, followed by the definition of the target research problem.
An assembly instruction is a sequence of one opcode and two operands: ins = Opcode, Operand1, Operand2 . Empty operands are substituted by the special token EMPTY. All opcodes and operands form a set, and each of them is assigned an index number. Thus, one instruction can be abstracted as a sequence of three integers, where each integer represents an index of an opcode or operand. A basic block is a sequence of assembly instructions b = ins 1 , ins 2 , ..., ins n , i.e., a sequence of sequences that contain three ordered integers. An assembly function is a set of basic blocks f = {b 1 , b 2 , ..., b m }. It should be noted that it is not a sequence, since there is no order in them. Their address in an executable can be arbitrarily changed without affecting the logic, as long as they are connected in the same way. Even though we do not explicitly express the connection information, we do not lose this information, because some instructions of the basic blocks, such as call, jump, etc., implicitly capture the connection information. Two assembly functions are clones of each other if they generate the exact same outputs for all possible inputs.
The ensemble of assembly code (i.e., the full logic) of an executable is a set of assembly functions {f 1 , f 2 , ..., f o }. The order of the functions in the executable is determined by the compiler and does not contain additional information. The formal definition of our target research problem malware detection is given below. Definition 1 (Malware Detection). Consider a collection of executables E and a collection of labels L that show the executables in E are benign or malicious. Let t be an unknown executable that t / ∈ E. The malware detection problem is to build a classification model M based on E and L such that M can be used to determine whether the executable t is benign or malicious.
METHODOLOGY
Our malware detection model I-MAD includes an H-Tran to learn a vector to represent the semantic meaning of the assembly code of a target executable and an IFFNN that takes the vector representing the assembly code of a target executable and vectors representing other features as its inputs to produce an interpretable detection result. Figure 1 is an overview of our malware detection model. In this section, we describe the customization of each Transformer in our proposed H-Tran as well as their training procedure, the other features we use, and the novel IFFNN and how we use it to interpret the detection results.
Encoder of Transformer
The core of each component of our H-Tran is a customized encoder of the Transformer network. The input to the Transformer encoder is a sequence of integers: x = x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n , and the output is a sequence of vectors: y = y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n . Each input integer represents the index of an item in a set. Each output vector y i represents the contextual semantic meaning of the corresponding item x i . The architecture of the encoder of Transformer is shown in Figure 2 . First, each input item x i is mapped to a vector representation e i ∈ R d model where d model is the specified dimension. e i is the summation of two vectors: one is the embedding of the item representing the semantic meaning of the item without any context; the other is the vector representing the position information, indicated by i, of the item in the sequence. So, e i contains both the semantic meaning of x i and its position information. The vector sequence e = e 1 , e 2 , ..., e n forms a matrix of the shape R n×d model , which is then fed to a stack of N identical neural network layers. These layers have the following properties:
• They are symmetric to the input vectors, which means that if we change the order of the input vectors, the order of the output vectors is also changed accordingly, but their values are not affected. • The N layers have the exact components, but different parameter values. • The input and output of each layer have the same shape R n×d model , which is the same as the shape of e, i.e., n vectors of the dimension d model . The input of the j-th layer is the output of the (j − 1)-th layer, except that the input to the first layer is e. Each layer mainly contains a multi-head attention sublayer and a point-wise, fully-connected sub-layer. The multihead attention sub-layer makes the vectors from the lower layer interact with each other from multiple aspects, so that its output is the vectors representing the contextual semantic meanings of the items. The point-wise, fully-connected sublayer generates higher-level features based on the contextual representations of items. There is also a residual connection and layer normalization following each of those two sublayers, since they can ease the training process of deep learning models [38] , [39] .
We refer the readers to the original paper of Transformer for more details [24] . Next, we introduce the customization of the encoder of Transformer for our purposes. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the "encoder of Transformer" as "Transformer" for simplicity.
Due to the innate hierarchical structure of assembly code of an executable, i.e., instructions forming basic blocks, basic blocks forming assembly functions, and assembly functions forming the full logic of an executable, we customize three Transformer networks in a hierarchy to learn the semantic meaning of assembly code at each level.
Bottom-Level Transformer to Understand Basic Blocks
The objective of our bottom-level Transformer is to generate a vector representing the semantic meaning of a basic block with the sequence of its instructions as the input. The standard Transformer cannot directly fulfill this purpose which can be seen from the formats of its input and output. The output of Transformer is n vectors representing the semantic meaning of each item in the sequence. However, in our case, we need one vector representing the semantic meaning of the whole sequence. The input of Transformer is a sequence of n integers, while the actual input in this case is a sequence of instructions, each of which is a sequence of three integers. Therefore, some customization is necessary. First, we modify the input embedding layer. Since both the embedding of an instruction ins i and its positional encoding should have dimensions of d model , we make the embeddings of the opcode and operands d model /3 dimensions and use the concatenation of them as the embedding of the instruction, which is then added with the positional encoding to form e i . This is the customization at the input layer. For the output, we need one vector from the output vectors to capture the semantic meaning of the entire sequence. Yet, all of the n instructions in a basic block are equally important. It is inappropriate to simply pick the output vector of any one of them to be the representation of the whole basic block. Therefore, we insert a special instruction at the beginning of every basic block (BEG, EM P T Y, EM P T Y ) to the input and train the output vector of this special instruction to represent the semantic meaning of the basic block. To train this customized Transformer, we propose the Masked Assembly Model task. This task is inspired by the Masked Language Model task proposed by Devlin et al. [7] . In that task, the authors mask random words from sentences and use Transformer to predict the masked words based on the contextual words in the sentences. Their method is to feed the output vector of the Transformer corresponding to a mask word to an output softmax over the vocabulary. The prediction requires both global context and local context. The global context means the semantic meaning of the whole sentence except the masked word. The local context means the position of the masked word and its surrounding words to indicate what ingredient the missing word should be. As the output vector corresponding to the masked word is the only information source for the output layer to make the prediction, it has to capture both global and local context. This does not fit our objective, since the output vector should only contain the semantic meaning of a basic block (i.e., global contextual information). Therefore, we separate the two kinds of information in two vectors: the output vector of the inserted instruction (BEG, EM P T Y, EM P T Y ) containing the global contextual information and the output vector of the masked instruction m = [M ASK_OP C, EM P T Y, EM P T Y ] containing the local contextual information. We concatenate those two vectors to form one vector and feed it to three feed-forward neural networks with softmax over the whole set of opcodes and operands to predict the opcode and two operands of the original masked instruction. Figure 3 illustrates how we customize the encoder of Transformer for the Masked Assembly Model task. It should be noted that after this training step, we only need to keep the customized Transformer, which generates the vector representing the semantic meaning of the entire basic block, because the three feed-forward neural networks to predict the original masked instruction are not used after the training for the Masked Assembly Model task.
Middle-Level Transformer to Understand Assembly Function
We have introduced the bottom-level Transformer to learn the vector representation of the semantic meaning of a basic block. Now, we customize Transformer to learn the vector representation of the semantic meaning of an assembly function from the set of vectors representing its basic blocks. It should be noted that the input is not a sequence of vectors, but a set of vectors in which the order is unimportant. The customization involves three steps: 1) we insert one trainable and randomly initialized vector to the input vector set for the same reason that we insert a special instruction to the input of the bottom-level Transformer. Its corresponding output vector represents the semantic meaning of the assembly function; 2) we abandon the input embedding layer as the input is already a set of vectors rather than integers; and 3) the positional encoding is also abandoned as there is no order in the input. Thus, we directly feed the set of vectors representing the basic blocks in any order to the N identical neural network layers. Since those layers are symmetric to the input vectors, irrespective of the order of the input vectors, the output of the inserted vector stays the same. Figure 4 depicts the proposed network. To make the network learn to generate the vector representation of the semantic meaning of an assembly function as the output of the inserted vector, we propose to train it with the Assembly Function Clone Detection task.
Definition 3 (Assembly Function Clone Detection)
. Let (f 1 , f 2 ) be an assembly function pair. Let (f 1 , f 2 , l) be a labeled assembly function pair in which the label l indicates whether the two assembly functions f 1 and f 2 are clones of each other. Consider a collection of labeled assembly function pairs F . Let p = (f 1 , f 2 ) be a new function pair that p is not any function pair in F . The assembly function clone detection task is to build a classification model M based on F to determine whether the two functions in p are clones of each other.
The idea is that if the vector representations of assembly functions can be used to determine whether two functions are clones of each other, they contain the semantic meaning of the assembly functions. We train the network to generate similar vectors in cosine measure for real assembly function clone pairs and dissimilar vectors for non-clone pairs. The way we form the function pair dataset is described in Section 5.
Top-Level Transformer to Understand Full Logic of An Executable
With the aforementioned neural network, we represent each assembly function with a vector. The next step is to learn one vector representing the full logic of an executable based on the vector representations of all its assembly functions. Technically, this is similar to learning the representation of an assembly function from the representations of its basic blocks, so the top-level Transformer is a duplicate of the middle-level Transformer. The top-level Transformer is fed to the IFFNN for malware detection without other pretraining task proposed for it.
Other Features
When malware is packed, or is polymorphic or metamorphic, the assembly code of its payload is encrypted and not statically accessible. Hence, using only assembly code would fail to identify its malicious purpose. According to the experience of previous works [12] , [27] , static analysis could still be effective because the use of those stealthy mechanisms could be captured when analyzed from multiple static feature scopes. Below, we describe the three kinds of features we use and how we improve the way to use them.
Printable Strings
According to the literature [25] , [27] , [29] , [30] , printable strings are important, because they include runtime-linked libraries and functions that are commonly used among malware, registry keys that are commonly used by malware, system paths, and sometimes the names of user-defined functions, etc. Hence, we extract printable strings from the whole byte sequence of an executable. In our algorithm, a continuous subsequence is a printable string if it satisfies three conditions: 1) all of its bytes are ASCII characters, 2) it is terminated with a null symbol, and 3) its length is at least 5 bytes. We count the number of instances of each printable string in the training set and put the strings that appear more than a certain threshold, which is 200 in our case in the frequent string set. Their frequencies in an executable are used as features. This is not new comparing with previous works. The improvement is that we also use the number of printable strings that are not in the frequent string set, i.e., uncommon strings, as a feature, and the total number of common printable strings in the executable as another feature. This is based on the intuition that encrypted malware has more uncommon printable strings and benign software has more common strings.
PE Imports
PE Imports are dynamically linked libraries and functions shown in the import address table of PE headers. The imports of an executable often illustrate its behaviors, e.g., modify the registry, or hook a procedure. The total number of imports show whether the executable is hiding its potential behaviors, because abnormally few imports indicate that runtime linking is largely used or most of its imports are hidden in encrypted data. Therefore, we compute these features in the same way as we compute the printable string features.
PE Header Numerical Features
There are many numerical fields in PE headers that contain information that could form different patterns among malware and benign software (benignware). Hence, we also use these values as features.
We concatenate the vector representing the full logic of an executable v code , printable string feature vector v str , 
Interpretable Feed-Forward Neural Network
Interpretability is an important quality of a machine learning model for malware detection. Inspired by the work of Choi et al. [9] which uses two attention-based RNN networks to form a softmax regression model with dynamic weights, we propose a novel interpretable feedforward neural network (IFFNN) to form a "dynamic logistic regression" model. Figure 5 illustrates the architecture of the IFFNN.
Let x ∈ R m be a feature vector representing a sample. We first feed it to a normal fully-connected layer:
Then, we apply another normal fully-connected layer of which the output vector has the same dimension as x:
where W 2 ∈ R m×d h , b 2 ∈ R m , and w(x) ∈ R m . w(x) serves as a weight vector for each feature in x. The final confidence that the input sample is positive (in malware detection, positive means malicious) is calculated as follows:
where b ∈ R is a bias term. This is similar to a logistic regression (i.e., y = sigmoid(w T x + b) , where w is a parameter vector), and the difference is that the weight vector w(x) is dynamically computed based on x rather than static parameters. Thus, this network has the same interpretability as logistic regression, but has the modelling power of a multi-layer network. The IFFNN can be used for any binomial classification task and can be plainly generalized to a "dynamic softmax regression" model for multinomial classification, as long as the sample can be represented as a vector with fixed dimension. The number of hidden layers except the weight vector layer, i.e., w(x), can also be extended to be more than one.
We feed v, the feature vector from multiple scopes of an executable, to the proposed IFFNN to get the confidence y that it is malicious: y = IF F N N (v), which completes the full network of the top-level model. Figure 6 illustrates this.
Attribution
For logistic regression:
., x m ] and w = [w 1 , w 2 , ..., w m ], the attribution is simple. Whether feature x j makes the sample positive depends on the sign of w j x j . If w j x j > 0, x j makes it positive, and vice versa. The degree of the impact of x j on y depends on |w j x j |: a large |w j x j | implies a large impact of x j . For example, if the model predicts a sample to be positive, the most influential factor that leads to the result is max j w j x j . If the model predicts a sample to be negative, the most influential factor that leads to the result is min j w j x j .
The same idea is applicable to our IFFNN for malware detection. Its top layer is a logistic regression with dynamically computed weight:
feature v j has a great impact on the prediction of malicious. If |w(v) j v j | is large and w(v) j v j < 0, feature v j has great impact on the prediction to benign. For printable string features, PE imports, and PE header numerical features, each dimension of their vector representations corresponds to a specific feature. The features can be the frequency of a certain string, whether a certain DLL is imported, the value of a certain numerical field, etc. By checking its w(v) j v j , we know whether it makes the executable more likely malicious or benign. For the vector representing the full logic of an executable: v code , each of its dimensions has no specific meaning, but we can see the impact of the full logic of the executable by computing the summation of the impact of each dimension of its vector: j∈v code w det,j v f ea,j . If it is positive, from the perspective of the full logic of an executable, it is considered malicious, and vice versa.
As v code is computed by our top-level Transformer-based network, the attention weights of the multi-head attention networks indicate the importance of each assembly function to the output vector. We compute the summed attention weights of each assembly function towards the output vector to show which assembly functions are the main factors that influence the classification results.
Model Training
To train the bottom-level Transformer, the objective function is the cross-entropy between the real masked opcode and operands and the predicted ones. To train the middlelevel Transformer and simultaneously fine-tune the bottomlevel Transformer, the objective function is the mean squared error between the computed cosine similarity between two assembly functions and the gold standard ones (i.e., 1 for clone function pairs, and -1 for non-clone function pairs). To train the full top-level network, the objective function is the cross-entropy between the predicted label and gold standard label of an executable. To ensure that the toplevel Transformer gets sufficient training, we first only train it without concatenating any other feature, i.e., feed v code instead of v to the IFFNN (y = IF F N N (v code )) and train it for malware detection. This is in fact the pre-training of the top-level Transformer. Then, we concatenate v code with other features to feed it to the IFFNN (y = IF F N N (v)) and train it the same way for malware detection. The two lower level Transformer networks are not fine-tuned when we train the top-level network. For all the training objectives, we use Adam [40] with the initial learning rate 1e − 4. We use early stopping with the validation set to avoid overfitting [41] .
EXPERIMENTS
The objectives of our experiments are to 1) evaluate the accuracy of I-MAD for malware detection, 2) compare with other state-of-the-art static malware detection solutions, and 3) demonstrate the interpretability of I-MAD.
We train and evaluate the models on a server with two Xeon E5-2697 CPUs, 384 GB memory, and four Nvidia Titan XP graphics cards. We use PyTorch [42] to implement our model. We use "pefile" 1 library to extract numerical features from PE headers.
Datasets and Pre-training
For the two pre-training tasks, we compile several open source projects with different compilation settings. O-LLVM 2 is an obfuscator of the LLVM compiler that provides control flow flattening, instruction substitution, and bogus control flow obfuscation mechanisms. We use O-LLVM to compile libcrypto, libgmp, libMagickCore, and libtomcrypt with five different settings: no obfuscation, one of the three obfuscation mechanisms, all three mechanisms. Thus, for every assembly function in those projects, we have five semantically equivalent versions. GCC compiler provides four different optimization levels (i.e., O0, O1, O2, O3) to compile projects. We compile busybox, coreutils, libcurl, libgmp, libtomcrypt, libz, magick, openssl, puttygen, and sqlite3 with GCC at all four optimization levels. Thus, we have four versions of every function of them. We use IDA Pro 3 , a commercial disassembler, to disassemble our compiled executables and acquire the assembly functions.
We use all the basic blocks of which the lengths are between 5 to 250 instructions to form our Masked Assembly Model dataset. As a result, it contains 38,427,440 basic blocks. We use all of them for training and none for testing, as the purpose of the dataset is to train the bottom-level Transformer to understand assembly code, and the accuracy of this task is uninformative.
We use the semantically equivalent but literally different functions we compiled to form real function clone pairs, and we randomly pair the same number of functions to be nonclone function pairs to create the dataset for the Assembly Function Clone Detection task. We limit the maximum number of instructions per basic block to be 50 and the maximum number of block per function to be 50 in this dataset, so that the memory of our graphics cards can hold the data flowing in the bottom two-level network. There are 213,656 function pairs in the training set, 26,898 functions in the validation set, and 26,746 functions in the test set. Our bottom twolevel networks get a classification accuracy of 91.3% on the test set. This means that the assembly function representations it computes and the representations of basic blocks that are fed to it indeed capture the semantic meanings of assembly code. We do not elaborate on the experiments for this task, since it is not the objective task, but rather a task to pre-train the middle-level Transformer and fine-tune the bottom-level Transformer.
For malware detection, we collected a dataset containing 4,361 benign and 6,096 malicious executables. There is no redundancy in the dataset. The benign executables are the .exe and .dll files from the installation paths of software programs. The malicious executables are collected from Mal-Share and VirusShare in 2018. The way we split the dataset into training set, validation set, and test set is introduced in the Experiment Setting Subsection.
Models For Comparison
We implement several state-of-the-art static malware detection models to compare with our I-MAD model.
•
Mosk2008OpBi
Moskovitch et al. [3] propose to use TF or TF-IDF of opcode bi-grams as features and use 2. https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki 3. https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ document frequency (DF), information gain ratio, or Fisher score as the criteria for feature selection. They apply Artificial Neural Networks, Decision Trees, Naïve Bayes, Boosted Decision Trees, and Boosted Naïve Bayes as their malware detection models.
• Bald2013Meta Baldangombo et al. [5] propose to extract multiple raw features from PE headers and use information Gain and calling frequencies for feature selection and PCA for dimension reduction. They apply SVM, J48, and Naïve Bayes as their malware detection models.
• Saxe15Deep Saxe et al. [6] propose a sophiscated deep learning model that works on four different features: byte/entropy histogram features, PE import features, string 2D histogram features, and PE metadata numerical features. We tried to follow the exact features they extract, but since they did not provide the exact metadata numerical fields they use, we just use the same numerical fields of PE headers used in our model as part of their input.
•
Mour2019CNN
Mourtaji et al. [43] convert malware binaries to grayscale images and apply a convolutional neural network (CNN) on malware images for malware classification. Their CNN network has two convolutional layers followed by a fully-connected layer. The values of hyper-parameters of their network are provided in their paper. Considering the fact that the best hyper-parameters for a neural network depend on the datasets, we set additional candidate values for the hyper-parameters of their network and tune them with the validation set to give their network more opportunities to achieve better results. Although their model was proposed for malware classification (i.e., to determine the malware family of a sample), we modify it to work on malware detection by changing the dimension of the output layer from the number of malware families to 1 and changing the output layer activation function from softmax function to logistic regression.
For the papers in which the authors describe multiple ways to select features and/or apply multiple machine learning models [3] , [5] , we try with all possible settings and report the best results their methods can achieve to compare with our model.
Experiment Settings
We use two different experiment settings to evaluate our I-MAD model and others. The main evaluation metric is accuracy (Acc), but we also evaluate them with precision (P), recall (R), and F1. 
K-Fold Cross-Validation
We first evaluate our model and others with k-fold cross-validation where k = 5. The original dataset is randomly split into 5 even subsets. The statistics of the dataset is given in Table 2 . Each subset takes turns to be chosen as the test set. One other subset takes turns to be chosen as the validation set. The other 3 subsets form the training set. Thus, we have 5 P 2 = 20 different experiment groups. We acquire the experiment results of the 20 groups and report the averages.
• Time Split Evaluation In addition to cross-validation evaluation, we also want to evaluate the models in a more challenging and realistic scenario. In real life, a malware detection system is expected to detect new malware from the knowledge of known malware.
To evaluate this ability of the models, we follow Saxe et al. [6] to perform a time split experiment. There are two settings in this experiment: A) the executables compiled between Jan. Table 3 . We run each model with different initialization and random seeds 5 times and report the averages of the results. The results of the k-fold cross-validation and the time split experiment are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 , respectively.
Results And Analysis
Our I-MAD achieves statistically significantly better F1 and accuracy than the other models in all experiments, as the p-values in t-test are much smaller than 0.01. The improvement of our model on accuracy and F1 are larger in the time split experiments than in the cross-validation experiment. Even though we make sure there is no redundancy in the dataset, some malware could be extensively similar to each other if they are from the same family and compiled with slightly different modifications. They are usually compiled close to each other in time in this case. In the time split experiment, the executables in the test set are strictly compiled later than any executable in the training and validation sets. Thus, the larger improvement of our detection model in that scenario indicates that it has better abilities to learn robust and consistent patterns from old samples that can be generalized for new samples. The vector representation of assembly code generated by our H-Tran and the improved way of using printable string and PE import features are shown to be the major contributors to the excellent performance of our model, which is illustrated in the attribution subsection below.
That being said, other models, except Mour2019CNN, also achieve reasonably good results in all experiments. However, none of them consistently achieves the second-best performance in all experiments. Even though Saxe15Deep uses features from multiple scopes, they do not show better results than Bald2013Meta and Mosk2008OpBi, like our model. The lack of any mechanism to understand assembly code and the less effective ways to represent printable string and PE import features could be two major reasons that lead to the differences on the performance.
Most models achieve higher accuracy than F1 in setting B of the time split experiment. This is because in its test set, the two classes of executables are not evenly distributed, and benignware is the majority. Thus, there are many true negative samples, i.e., benign executables correctly recognized by the models, which contribute to their accuracy, but not F1. The situation is just the opposite in setting A.
Mour2019CNN performs much worse than other models, even though we tried alternative hyper-parameter values for it besides the values the authors provided. It becomes much worse when the training set is significantly smaller in setting B of the time split experiment. We indeed observe overfitting, as its accuracy on the training set achieves 84.9%, while on the test set it is 28.1%. Even though our model is also a deep learning model, it does not suffer from the overfitting problem, because we use two pre-training tasks to adequately train the two bottom level Transformer networks with the rich information embedded in assembly code. In contrast, Mour2019CNN can only be trained with the labels of executables, which is insufficient. Table 1 has shown how our model interpret the detection result of a sample. It can be seen that the assembly code of the target executable is the primary reason leading to the prediction of the malicious class. We checked the two assembly functions that are mainly focused on and found that they set the program to sleep for a certain time and then download an embedded executable from a remote address and run it.
Attribution
To better understand the impacts of the features we use, Table 6 shows the five most frequent main factors leading the prediction of a sample to be malware or benign. The assembly code of an executable is one of the most frequent factors influencing the prediction of an executable to be malicious or benign. It means that the vector representing the semantic meaning of assembly code computed by our H-Tran is very effective for malware detection. Our proposed features, number of uncommon strings and number of PE imports, are also frequent main factors for predicting a sample to either class, which means they are highly effective. This observation also shows the superiority of our IFFNN over logistic regression: as number of uncommon strings and number of PE imports always have non-negative values, when each of them serves as a main factor leading to the prediction of the malicious class, its weight is positive (i.e., w(v) j v j > 0&v j > 0 ⇒ w(v) j > 0), and when it serves as a main factor leading to the prediction of the benign class, its weight is negative (i.e., w(v) j v j < 0&v j > 0 ⇒ w(v) j < 0). This cannot be achieved by logistic regression, since when it is trained, the weight for each feature is determined, irrelevant of the input samples. However, the weight of each feature in IFFNN is dynamically computed depending on the whole context, i.e., the vector representing all features.
We randomly examined the assembly functions of some malware that are mainly focused on by the top layer multihead attention network. Many of them concern malicious behaviors, such as installing itself into some registry, hijacking some common legitimate DLL, and injection to another process.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present I-MAD, a novel deep learning model for static malware detection that is based on the understanding of assembly code. In addition to its excellent detection performance, it can also provide interpretation for its detection results, which can be examined by malware analysts. Therefore, in addition to being a malware detector, it can also help malware analysts locate malicious payloads and find consistent patterns in malware samples.
